<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" version="2.0"><channel><title>Linux - Tag - Coding braindump</title><link>https://dev-initely.me/tags/linux/</link><description>Linux - Tag - Coding braindump</description><generator>Hugo -- gohugo.io</generator><language>en</language><lastBuildDate>Fri, 26 Jun 2026 08:13:00 +0200</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://dev-initely.me/tags/linux/" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>Improving security of using AUR packages: paru, devtools chroot</title><link>https://dev-initely.me/posts/tools/aur-hardening-paru-chroot/</link><pubDate>Fri, 26 Jun 2026 08:13:00 +0200</pubDate><author>mor3dr3ad</author><guid>https://dev-initely.me/posts/tools/aur-hardening-paru-chroot/</guid><description><![CDATA[<p>Recently a malicious AUR package used a npm dependency (<code>atomic-lockfile</code>) to compromise systems. What was insidious about the attack was that it was more indirect than installing a simple backdoor: the PKGBUILD looked clean, instead the payload was in a transitive npm dependency.</p>
<p>That means it was very hard to detect (I certainly do not check all AUR dependencies) and it ran silently during the install phase. The incident was a good opportunity to have a closer look at my own setup.</p>]]></description></item><item><title>AUR Supply Chain Attack: How to check your (Arch Linux) System</title><link>https://dev-initely.me/posts/aur-supply-chain-attack/</link><pubDate>Sat, 13 Jun 2026 05:55:00 +0200</pubDate><author>mor3dr3ad</author><guid>https://dev-initely.me/posts/aur-supply-chain-attack/</guid><description><![CDATA[<p>The supply chain attacks on linux just keep coming: in June 2026, a malicious package was discovered in the Arch User Repository (AUR). I first read about this in <a href="https://ioctl.fail/preliminary-analysis-of-aur-malware/" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreffer ">ioctl.fail</a>. Here is what happened in the short version (for long version go to ioctl.fail).</p>
<p>An attacker masked a binary by hiding it in the dependency tree of (the legitimate package) <code>atomic-lockfile</code> (v1.4.2). The hidden binary runs at install time via an npm hook. It is designed to steal credentials, installs a persistent systemd service and loads an eBPF rootkit to hide itself and exfiltrates everything over Tor. All silently - so this is pretty advanced stuff.</p>]]></description></item></channel></rss>